Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2003: Hearing on H. R. 2390 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., June 10, 2003 (Statement of John R. Thomas, Prof. of Law, Geo. U. L. Center) by Thomas, John R.
Georgetown University Law Center
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW
2003
Cooperative Research and Technology
Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2003: Hearing on
H. R. 2390 Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., June 10, 2003
(Statement of John R. Thomas, Prof. of Law, Geo. U.
L. Center)
John R. Thomas
Georgetown University Law Center, jrt6@law.georgetown.edu
CIS-No.: 2003-H521-40
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/97
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Science and Technology Commons
COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 
ENHANCEMENT (CREATE) ACf OF 2003 
HEARING 
BEFORE THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, THE INTERNET, 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS 
FIRST SESSION 
ON 
H.R. 2391 
JUNE 10, 2003 
Serial No. 33 
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/judiciary 
87-624 PDF 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON: 2003 
For sale by the Superintendent of Dccuments. U.S. Government Printins Office 
Internet: bookatore.gpo.gov Phone: toll fTe6 (886) 612-1800; DC area (202) 612-1800 
Fez: (202) 612-2260 Mail: Stop BSOP. Wuhington. DC 20402-0001 
-~" "~' " 
.. , ;,. 
COMMl'M'EE ON THE JUDICIARY 
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER. JR .• Wisconsin. Chairman 
HENRY J. HYDE, minoie 
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 
LAMAR SMITH. Texas 
ELTON GALLEGLY, California 
BOB GOODLATTE. Virginia 
STEVE CHABOT. Ohio 
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennessee 
CHRIS CANNON, Utah 
SPENCER BACHUS. Alabama 
JOHN N. HOSTETrLER. Indiana 
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 
RIC KELLER. Florida 
MELISSA A. HART. Pennsylvania 
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 
MIKE PENCE, Indiana 
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 
STEVE KING, Iowa 
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 
TOM FEENEY. Florida 
MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 
JOHN CONYERS, JR .• Michigan 
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 
RICK BOUCHER. Virginia 
JERROLD NADLER, New York· 
ROBERT C. SCOTI'. Virginia 
MELVIN L. WATI', North Carolina 
ZOE LOFGREN. California 
SHEILA JACKSON LEE; Texas 
MAXINE WATERS, California 
MARTIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT. Ma88achusetts 
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 
ADAM B. sqmFF, California 
LINDA T. SANCHEZ. California 
PHILIP G. KIKO. Chief of Staff-General CounMl 
PERRY H. APELBAUM. Minority Chief Counsel 
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, THE INTERNET, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAMAR SMITH, Texas. Chairman 
HENRY J. HYDE, minois 
ELTON GALLEGLY, California 
BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 
WILLIAM L. JENKINS, Tennesaee 
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama 
MARK GREEN, Wisconsin 
RIC KELLER, Florida 
MELISSA A. HART, Pennsylvania 
MIKE PENCE, Indiana 
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 
JOHN R. CARTER, Texas 
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 
JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia 
ZOE LOFGREN, California 
MAXINE WATERS, California 
MAR'fIN T. MEEHAN, Massachusetts 
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts 
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida 
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin 
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York 
BLAINE MERRJ'IT, Chief Counsel 
DEBRA RosE, Counsel 
DAVID WHITNEY, Counsel 
MELISSA L. McDoNALD, Full Committee Counsel 
ALEC FRENCH, Minority Counsel 
(II) 
," .' 
' .. 
CONTENTS j 
JUNE 10, 2003 
OPENING STATEMENT 
The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress From the State 
of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intel-
n!:.w:o~1e1'o;;;~r"l;:·B~~~~·:·~··&p~~~~~ii~~··i~··c~~g;~~~"~~"ih~ 
State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property ................................................................... . 
WITNESSES 
Dr. Jon Soderstrom, Ph.D., Manl:lging Director, Office of Cooperative Re-
search, Yale University, New Haven. CT. on behalf of the Association 
of University Technology Managers 
Oral Testimony .................................................................................................... . 
M;,rel~~~~t,r~p~~~~··~~d· ·p~~~t···At~;:;;~y:··S~~~;··K~~·~i~~:··a;;id~t;;i~ 
and Fox, Washington. DC 
Oral Testimony .................................................................................................... . 
M::?e~~ ~~~:h~~:·P~rl~~~·~d··P~~~i··At~;:;;~y ... si·di~y:·A~~i~~··B·~~ 
and Wood. Washington, DC 
Oral Testimony ................................................................................................... .. 
M::?o~ei~¥h~::~~ ~~f~~~~~·~f·~;:··~~g~~m··U~;~;;;iiy··~;;··C~~~~; 
Washington, DC 
Oral Testimony .................................................................................................... . 
Prepared Statement ............................................................................................ . 
APPENDIX 
MATERIAL SUBMI1TED FOR THE HEARING RECORD 
Page 
1 
2 
4 
6 
10 
11 
30 
82 
39 
41 
Letter from Carl E. Gulbrandsen, Managing Director, Wisconsin Alumni Re· 
search Foundation ................................................................................................ 53 
(III) 
,\ 
39 
proposals then under discussion would have amended § 103(c) to give "research col-
laborations" a status equal to common ownership or assi~ent of rights to an in-
vention under the statute. Testimony at last years heanng reflected a number of 
concerns over that approach to resolvmg the concerns over the Oddzon decision. 
For example, some opposed the concept of amending § 103(c) to equate "research 
collaborations" with situations of common ownership and assignment. Such changes, 
it was feared, would introduce more uncertainty into an area that already suffers 
from excessive confusion. It was also suggested that a "loosened" § 103(c) standard 
could ~ve rise to new types of double patenting problems, or could create undesir-
able sItuations such as two patents issued to separate entities on inventions that 
were mere obvious variations of each other. 
The current proposal effectively addresses the concerns that were expressed last 
year. 
• The current proposal does not depart from the requirement of common owner-
ship or assignment as found in current section § 103(c). AI! a result, no issues 
arise regarding the difficulties of defining what constitutes a "research col-
laboration" or how courts would deal with such a definition . 
• Under the amended standard, § 103 will continue to prevent multiple patents 
from issuing to different legal entities on "obvious" variations of an invention 
where there has been no common assignment or ownership of the invention. 
It does so by continuing to preserve the abiHtr of a first inventor who has 
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed an Invention to prevent another 
party from obtaining a patent on an obvious variant of that Invention. If the 
first and second parties both file patent applications, only one will obtain a 
patent, as is the case today. 
• No new issues of "double patenting" will arise under the amended standard. 
This is because in situations where only 102(0 is implicated, there will be no 
"other patent." If there is another patent, section 102(e) will prevent the 
issuance of a later patent on an obvious variation of that first patent. 
Thus, the legislation effectively responds to the concerns voiced last year. 
I commena the Subcommittee for taking steps to improve the collaborative re-
search and development environment in the United States. The proposed amend-
ments will improve certainty in operation of the patent law, and will resolve many 
of the concerns voiced by the university community last year. If enacted, the legisla-
tion will promote research among the university and private sector, primarily by re-
moving disincentives and risks that would otherwise deter such cooperation. 
Thank you for the opportunity to express my views. 
Mr. SMITH. Professor Thomas? 
STATEMENT OF JOHN R. THOMAS, PROFESSOR OF LAW, 
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON, DC 
Mr. THOMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the oppor-
tunity to appear before the Subcommittee. I have come in my per-
sonal capacity as a concerned observer of the patent system. 
Let me recap by stating that to understand the purposes of the 
CREATE Act, an overview of patent law fundamentals may be ap-
propriate. For an invention to belatented, it must meet two funda-
mental requirements, novelty an non-obviousness. The novelty re-
quirement is found in Section 102 of the Patent Act and it requires 
that an invention just be different, really just be basically different 
from what has come before. Section 102 also details in a lot of de-
tail, and when I teach this section I call it the "long march" of all 
the different sources of knowledge that may be considered in these 
inquiries, things like patents, earlier publications, earlier public 
uses, and the sum of this knowledge, as you said, Mr. Chairman, 
is termed therrior art. 
Now, one 0 the seven paragraphs of Section 102, paragraph (0, 
prevents a patent from issuing to an applicant who did not himself 
Invent the subject matter sought to be patented, and this makes a 
lot of sense. Only the true inventor ought to apply for a patent and 
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receive one. If the patent applicant merely derived that information 
from another, he shouldn't. be awarded a patent. We ought to get 
the true illNentor having the patent. 
Now, importantly, 'for SectIOn 102(f).to -defeat a. patent, the pat-
ent or patent application must be identical to what was disclosed. 
That is the anticipation or novelty requirement.' Generally speak-
ing, even a small variation will block the use of Section 102(0. 
Section 102(f) is infrequently used because ·as a predicate to de-
rived information from another, that other person'llIUst have in-
vented it first. So usually, one of those rrovisions that speaks to 
the first inventor getting the patent wi1 appl¥.:. So Section 102(0 
is generally limited to trade secrets, which don t count as prior art 
under another provision, and foreign oral disclosures, disclosures 
that occurred overseas but were not written down. Those also don't 
. count as prior art under any of the other Section 102 paragraphs. 
_ Now, as we have heard, Section 102(0 applies to non-obVIouS 
through the OddzOn case. The second fundamental requirement of 
patenting is .non-obviousness. This allows the combination of ref-
erences to be employed or one .teaching with stirring in the knowl-
edge of the prior art. In Section 102(0, it can be an input to non-
obviousness. Derived information is evidence under current law of 
non-obviousness or not. 
Now, so. much, for the basics. What about the CREATE Act? 
When consideDing the:consequenees of the CREATE Act, it is im-
portant to remember that·the :patent law was all about incentives, 
and what are some of the incentives that the' CREATE Act might 
cause? 
Well, first, the.CREATE Act might encoura~e innovative individ-
.uals . to make their. inventions 1 publicly avaIlable in the United 
. States. by . publishing, by patenting or some other mechanism. If 
they don't,. then ,another .individual might come along, make a 
. minor variation, 'and be 'able to obtain a patent on that invention. 
This effect comports with the general notion of the patent law that 
we want people to publish. We want people to disclose their innova-
tions. 
However, the CREATE Act might also have a ''listen but don't 
talk" effect. On the other hand, it may make inventors less willing 
to collaborate out of fear that others will take what has been dis-
·closed to them, make a minor modification, and then seek patent 
protection themselves, although there are other mechanisms in the 
patent law for the original inventor to claim that she is the first 
inventor, such as provoking interference or claiming that she 
should be a joint inventor. Those are more costly and may not be 
available in all circumstances. 
The CREATE Act might also encourage individuals to go abroad, 
listen to all disclosures, bring that disclosure back in this country, 
make a minor modification, and obtain a patent. This arrangement 
effectively would resurrect the old English notion of a patent of im-
portation, which were granted not to the first inventor, but for the 
first person who brought a technology into the realm. 
I also observe that by expressly excluding Section 102(0 from 
non-obviousness considerations, that would be the only one of seven 
paragraphs of Section 102(0 that says it doesn't apply to obvious-
ness. The negative implication is that all the other paragraphs do 
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apply for non-obviousness determinations. That is pretty much 
what the courts do right now, but there are a couple of the more 
obscure sections of 102, Section 103(c) and (d), where the Federal 
Circuit has said in dicta do not apply to non-obviousness. So, in ef-
fect, this bill might not only overturn the principal holding of the 
OddzOn case, it might overturn the dicta, too. 
Finally, it is important to remember that sometimes one prior art 
t:eference, like a scientific publication or a patent, applies under 
more than one paragraph of Section 102(0. So I think you would 
want to stress that if a reference was available under another 
paragraph of Section 102, as well as 102(0, that it would apply as 
prior art. So you could add the word "exclusively" into Section 
102(0 to avoid this difficulty. 
Thank you very much. 
Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Professor Thomas. 
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas follows:] 
PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN R. THOMAS 
I appreciate this opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee. I have come 
today in my personal capacity as a concerned observer of the patent system. 
The Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement Act of 2003 (the CRE-
ATE Act) succinctly provides that prior art available under 35 U.S.C. § 102<0 may 
not be considered as evidence of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. The effect of 
the Act is to overturn the 1997 holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit in OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc.,1 which ruled that derived prior 
art may serve as evidence of obviousness. 
To understand the impact of the CREATE Act, an overview of some patent law 
fundamentals may be appropriate. For an invention to be patented, it must meet 
two fundamental requirements: novelty and nonbviousness. The novelty require-
ment, stipulated in § 102 of the Patent Act, requires that the invention differ from 
earlier knowledge. Section 102 details which knowledge-such as earlier patents, 
publications and public uses-ma~ be considered in this inquiry. The sum of this 
knowledge is temIed the "prior art in patent parlence. 
One of the seven paragraphs of § 102, paragraph <0, prevents a patent from 
issuin§ to an applicant who "did not himself invent the subject matter sought to pat-
ented. 2 This provision presents something of a standing requirement, mandating 
that only the true inventor apply for a parent. If a patent applicant merely derived 
the invention from another person, then he should not be awarded a patent. A 
prima facie case of derivation entails a showing of another's prior conception of the 
claimed subject matter along with an awareness of that conception by the applicant 
or patentee.3 Importantly, to defeat a patent or patent application, the derived infor-
mation under § 102(0 must be identical to the claimed invention. Generally speak-
ing, even a small variation will block the use of § 102(0. 
Section 102(0 is not often used in patent acquisition proceedings at the U.S. Pat-
ent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Even in adversarial proceedings, such as inter-
ferences and enforcemer:t litigation, the courts have not employed § 102(0 with great 
frequency. The scarce use of § 102(0 results from the fact that a predicate to deriva-
tion is that another person first invented the subject matter sought to be patented. 
As a result, another prior art provision, such as § 102(a), ordinarily applies to such 
cases.4 Parties adverse to the patent generally will find proofs of patent invalidity 
more straightforward under § 102(a), which does not entaiLthe nettlesome issues of 
communication and copying. 
As a result, § 102(0 is most often employed in factual circumstances where 
§ 102(a) does not apply. In particular, § 102(0 is not limited to inventions conceived 
''in this country," nor have courts imposed a requirement that the knowledge be 
1122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
235 U.S.C. § 102<0 (2000). 
3 Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
435 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000) denies a patent if "the invention was known or used by others in 
this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country. before 
the invention thereof by the applicant for patent .... " 
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publicly accessible as they have in § 102(a).6 Paragraph (0 would be the only part 
of § 102 that would apply, for example, to oral disclosures that occurred abroad, or 
to derived knowledge that has been kept as a trade secret. 
The second fundamental ~uirement of patenting, nonobviousness. is set out in 
§ 103 of the Patent Act.6 To be considered nonobvious. the invention must not have 
been within the ordinary capacities of a person of ordinary skill in the art.7 Unlike 
the novelty requirement of § 102, a patent or patent application may fail to meet 
§ 103 even ,though its subject matter is not identically disclosed in the prior art. A 
combination of different teachings. or even small changes from a single teaching. 
mE!)' be used to show that the invention would have been obvious.8 'i 
Section 102(0 relates to the nonobviousness requirement of § 103(a) in the fol-
lowing way. Section 103(a) does not expressly define which prior art may be consid-
ered when a court. or USPTO patent examiner, has to decide whether the invention 
would have been obvious. Generally speaktng;'the courts have filled this gap by 
holding that prior art described in § 102), including "paragraph (0, serves as the basis 
for nonobviousness determinations.9 U~PTO regulations comport with these hold-
ings. tO Congress has also specified in § 103{c) that § 102{f) art is exempted from non-
obviousness considerations if the prior art under § 102(0 and the cloomed invention 
were either owned by, or subject to an obligation of assignment to. a single entity 
at the time the invention was made.ll In essence, the CREATE Act would expand 
this limited exception, instead excluding § 102(1) art entirely from nonobviousness 
determinations. 
Several possible consequences flow from the CREATE Act. First, the CREATE Act 
would encourage innovative individuals to make their inventions p~blicly avail-
able-for example. by publishing or patenting the invention-in the United States. 
If they do not" then another individual may make a minor modification to the dis-
closed invention and patent it himself. This effect comports with the general notion 
in patent law, that prior art b!l.publicly available, rather than secret knowledge. 
On the other hand, the CREATE Act may encourage individuals to file patents 
on inventions that are obvious variations of derived information. For example, it 
would be possible for an individual to attend a technical conference overseas. listen 
to an oral disclosure of another's invention. and then obtain a U.S. patent claiming 
a minor variation of the disclosed subject matter. This arrangement effectively res-
urrectS the old English notion of a "patent of importation" to the first person dis-
closing 'an invention domestically, even though that person was not the first inven-
tor.t2 
It is important t\l note that the true inventor is not wholly without remedy in 
such circumstances. He may, for example file a patent application and attempt to 
provoke an interference under 35 U.S.C. § 102(gX1). However, this step may entail 
considerable costs that § 102(0 did not. Note also that the true inventor may not 
be able to prove that he is the first inventor outside of interference proceedings, due 
to the fact that his activities did not occur "in this country" under the language of 
35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). 
In this vein, it does not appear that the CREATE Act works towards international 
harmonization llf the patent laws. Consider Article 54(2) of the. European Patent 
Convention, which provides: 
The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made avai1able to the 
public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, 
before the date of filing of the European patent apphcation. 
Under European Patent Convention, subject matter derived from foreign oral disclo-
sures counts as prior art, while under the CREATE Act it may not. 
r.See OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
6 Under 35 U.S.C, § 103(a) (2000): 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as 
set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious 
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains. 
735 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
8Roger E. Schechter & John R. Thoma8, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights. Pat-
ents and Trademarks 370 (2003). 
90ddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997), According to the 
OddzOn court, prior art under paragraphs (c) and (d) of § 102 does not apply to nonobviousnes8 
determinations under § 103(a). 
1037 C.F.R. § 1.l06(d). 
11 35 U.S.C. § 103(e} (2000). 
12See Martin J. Adelman et at., Patent Law: Cases and Materials 427-28 (2d ed. 2003). 
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In terms of cooperative research, the CREATE ACT may make innovators more 
willing to make use of discussions with their colleagues in future work. On the other 
hand, it may make innovators less willing to collaborate, out of fear that others will 
modify their inventions and obtain patent protection on them. This concern is less 
pressing for domestic than forei~ inventors, as a U.S.-based inventor would be able 
to demonstrate prior inventorship under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2). In addition, both for-
eign and domestic inventors may be able to claim status as joint inventors under 
35 U.S.C. § 116. 
I also observe that by expressly excluding § 102(0 prior art for nonobviousness, 
the CREATE Act implies that prior art available under the six remaining para-
graphs may be consulted for purposes of § 103. This result largely comports with 
current case law of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its prede-
cessor courts. However, it should be noted that in the OddzOn case, the Federal Cir-
cuit stated in dicta that two of the more obscure _paragraphs of § 102-the public 
abandonment bar of paragraph (c) and the delayed U.S. filing bar of paragraph (d)-
did not apply to nonobviousness. 13 The CREA'fE Act may well be considered to have 
overturned the dicta of OddzOn as well. 
Finally, it is important to remember that sometime one prior art reference-such 
as a scientific journal articl&-may be described by more than one paragraph of 
§ 102. Congress may wish to specify that prior art that is available under both 
§ 102(0 and another paragraph or § lO2-for example, the statutory bars of 
§ 102(b}-may be consulted during the nonobviousness inquiry of § 103. Put dif-
ferently, the CREATE Act could be amended to specify that § 102(0 prior art may 
not be considered for purposes of nonobviousness only if that subject matter is prior 
art exclusively under § 102(0. 
Thank you for hearing my testimony. I would be delighted to answer any ques-
~L . 
Mr. SMITH. Thank you all for pointing out how important this 
kind of collaborative research is to the economy and for supporting 
what we are trying to do with this legislation, which is to eliminate 
some of the concerns that we have about the OddzOn case, and 
that is much appreciated. 
Actually, today's hearing is almost a quintessential example of 
what hearings are supposed to do, which is refine and tweak legis-
lation to try to improve it, and you all have made several sugges-
tions. 
What I would like to do, Dr. Soderstrom, is to ask you and Mr. 
Kushan to respond to a couple of the suggestions made by Mr. 
Steffe and Mr. Thomas. Both Mr. Steffe and Mr. Thomas have 
mentioned Section 102(0. Professor Thomas, in your prepared testi-
mony, you talked about some concerns you had about foreign in-
ventors, as well, which I would like to go into in a minute. 
And then, also, I don't want to leave you all, Professor Thomas 
and Mr. Steffe, in a position where you can't respond. What I want 
to do is get a discussion going among you four experts to see what 
we need to do. 
But let me read from Mr. Steffe's written testimony, and it will 
be very precise in regard to that Section 102(0, and then ask Dr. 
Soderstrom and Mr. Kushan to respond initially, and then the oth-
ers respond afterward. 
This is Mr. Steffe's testimony. "In fact, I would go further than 
the proposed bill by removing mention of Section 102(0 from Sec-
tion 103(c) and by amending Section 102(0 to read, 'A person shall 
be entitled to a patent unless he did not himself invent the subject 
matter sought to be patented, except that subject matter commu-
nicated from a co-inventor shall not be considered prior art under 
this subsection.' My proposal would address, among other things, 
13See OddzOn Products. Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc. 122 F.3d 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
